Before entering into the specific proposal, I consider it advisable to provide six brief explanations in point A, by way of introduction, firstly, on what public international law (PIL) is and who the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is; what the law of war is, which is one of the branches of PIL, delving into one of its three sub-branches, international humanitarian law (IHL); and what international human rights law (IHRL) is and its main mechanisms, including the Human Rights Council (HRC).

Second and third, a brief explanation, from an PIL perspective, of the documents that gave rise to this conflict; and then the UN resolutions that seek to lay the foundations for the resolution of the conflict.

Fourthly, I present the framework of agreements signed between Israel and Palestine, mainly between 1993 and 1995, the date from which the negotiation and signing of a permanent statute allowing for the creation of the Palestinian state has been pending, seeking to analyse the main flaws in these documents.

I then describe Israel’s violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people.

Finally, I describe the position of the European Union (EU) in the conflict, as I want it to play an important role in the resolution of the conflict.

In point B of this document, I put forward a proposal for a solution. Whether this or any other proposal will lead to a definitive solution to the century-old Palestinian question remains open to question. Let us hope (Ojalá: Spanish word derived from the Arabic inshaallah: ‘If Allah wills’) that, together, this time we can achieve it… Long live a free and sovereign Palestine on an equal footing with a fully democratic Israel!

All the sources of information consulted are included in a pdf (only available in Spanish-Castilian) that you will find in the Spanish- Castilian version (castellano) of this entry on this website.

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Brief notions of international law

1.1. Public International Law

Public international law (PIL) is the body of rules that regulates the behaviour of states and other international subjects (international organisations, belligerent communities, national liberation movements and/or individuals). PIL is composed of or has as its sources:

1. Agreements between states, such as international treaties, with different denominations depending on the case, such as treaties, pacts, conventions, letters, memorandum, joint declarations, exchanges of notes, etc.;
2. International custom, which in turn consists of the practice of states, which they recognise as binding;
3. General principles of law.

The main international body is the United Nations (UN) which came into being on 24 October 1945 (24/10/1945). It is the successor to the League of Nations (LoN) which existed between 1919 and 1946. It is governed by the UN Charter. It is made up of six organs, the first five of which are based in New York (United States, USA) and the sixth, the ICJ, in The Hague (Netherlands), and they are:

1. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the main deliberative body and brings together 193 member states, to which Palestine and the Holy See are added as non-member states. It is the only one of the six organs in which all member states are on an absolutely equal footing in terms of rights and obligations. Its powers include overseeing the UN budget; appointing non-permanent members to the Security Council; receiving reports from other UN bodies; and making recommendations in the form of UN General Assembly resolutions. It meets in regular plenary sessions; in special plenary sessions; and in committees. The main committees are:

• First Committee: Disarmament and International Security (DISEC).
• Second Committee: Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOSOC).
• Third Committee: Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs (SOCHUM).
• Fourth Committee: Special Policy and Decolonisation (SPECPOL).
• Fifth committee: Administrative and budgetary matters.
• Sixth committee: Legal.

2. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the body charged with maintaining peace and security in the world. Unlike other UN institutions that can only make recommendations to governments, the Security Council can make binding decisions (governed by Article 25 of the UN Charter) and oblige members to comply with them. The Council is composed of fifteen states, five permanent members with veto power (US, UK, France, Russia and China) and ten non-permanent members, which are elected for a two-year term. The presidency of the Council rotates monthly in alphabetical order.

3. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) assists the General Assembly in promoting economic, social and international cooperation and development. It has a total of 54 members who are elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. It holds a four-week substantive session in July each year, one year in New York and one in Geneva. It is responsible for coordinating the work of the fifteen specialised agencies, the ten functional commissions and the five regional commissions of the UN, and issues policy recommendations to the UN system and member states.

4. The United Nations Secretariat (UNSG)  is the administrative body whose head is the highest diplomatic representation of the United Nations. He/she is appointed by the UNGA on the recommendation of the UNSC. Its powers include convening the UNSC, the UNGA, ECOSOC and other UN bodies. In 2021 the Portuguese António Guterres was re-elected as UN Secretary-General for a second and final five-year term: 2022-2026.

5. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations was established in Chapter XIII of the UN Charter to oversee the administration of trust territories placed under trusteeship and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. It was the successor to the League of Nations mandates. It was dissolved in 1994 by the UNSC after it had completed its function.

6. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) which existed from 1921 to 1946. It is composed of 15 judges with a 9-year term of office. Only states may be parties to cases brought before the ICJ. The ICJ is governed by its Statute, article 38 of which establishes that the ICJ must apply the three sources of law mentioned above in all its proceedings, to which it adds a fourth, case law, which is not a source of law, but an auxiliary method. There are two types of ICJ proceedings:

6.1. The contentious (for disputes between states) which concludes with a judgment. As far as judgments are concerned, an ICJ judgment is binding, final and without possibility of appeal, since, as a consequence of signing the UN Charter, each Member State automatically undertakes to obey any ICJ judgment in matters to which it is a party. However, in practice: (1.1.) the ICJ’s powers have been limited by the fact that it lacks the power to enforce the judgement rendered, usually resorting, in the event of non-compliance, simply to sanctions or fines; (1.2.) the ICJ also lacks the competence to verify the effective enforcement of its judgements by States, but it is up to the parties to the dispute to fulfil their international obligations by giving effect to the judgement in accordance with the terms laid down by the ICJ; (1. 3.) and, in the event that a state fails to comply with an ICJ ruling, the other party to the dispute has the right to appeal to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), although this route has never been successful in helping to enforce the ruling, as the ruling always goes against the interests of one of the five member countries of the Security Council, which have veto power over any decision taken.

6.2. The advisory (for legal clarifications to UN bodies) which concludes with an opinion. Unless it has been agreed that the ruling is binding, ICJ rulings are in principle advisory and therefore not binding on the parties requesting them. However, certain rules or instruments may give the parties advance notice that the resulting opinion will be binding.

South Africa initiated a case against Israel for genocide on 29/12/2023 over the war in Gaza, the 192nd case in the history of the ICJ, which will issue a judgement in a few years. If we extrapolate the timelines of a similar Genocide Convention enforcement case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar over the Rohingya, the Gaza judgement could be seeing the light of day in 2029 or 2030.

The ICJ is not the only means of peaceful dispute resolution available to states. Article 33 of the UN Charter lists others, such as ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or any other peaceful means of their own choice’.

Nor is the ICJ the only international tribunal. There are others, including the International Criminal Court (ICC)  which is a permanent international court of justice whose mission is to try individuals (not states) accused of committing crimes of genocide, war, aggression and crimes against humanity. It has its own legal personality. It does not belong to the UN system, although it is related to it under the terms of its Statute, the Rome Statute of 1998. It is  also based in The Hague.

On 2/01/2015 Palestine applied to become a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC; and the Rome Statute entered into force for Palestine on 1/04/2015. On 22/05/2018, Palestine referred crimes committed in the Occupied Territories since 13/06/2014 to the ICC Office of the Prosecutor. The Office of the Prosecutor initiated an investigation, in the framework of which it asked Pre-Trial Chamber I for an opinion on the ICC’s ‘territorial jurisdiction’ and this Chamber, in its decision of 5/02/2021, concluded, by majority, that yes, the ICC’s ‘territorial jurisdiction’ extends to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. On 3/03/2021 the Office of the Prosecutor announced the opening of investigations. On 17/11/2023, five countries led by South Africa submitted a request to the Office of the Prosecutor to extend its investigations into Gaza from 7/10/2023, similar to what Chile and Mexico did on 18/01/2024.

On 20/05/2024, ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan requested the issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as for three Hamas leaders: Yahya Sinwar, Mohamed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri and Ismail Haniyah.

In addition to the above, the UN has several funds, programmes and other entities attached to it, including UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). The Palestinian population also has a specific committee, unique in the UN universe, which is the Committee for the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

Finally, within the UN, the UNISPAL information portal brings together all the information related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (https://www.un.org/unispal/).

1.2. Law of war

The law of war is considered an aspect of public international law (PIL) that regulates the conditions: (1) for initiating a war (ius ad bellum); (2) for conducting the fighting (ius in bello); and (3) for ending a war including the obligation to rebuild (ius post bellum).

The modern laws of war derive from two main sources:

1. international treaties on the laws of war.
2. International custom.

Some of the central principles underlying the laws of war are:

1. Wars must be limited to the pursuit of the political objectives that initiated the war and must not include unnecessary destruction.
2. Wars must be brought to an end as quickly as possible.
3. Persons and property that do not contribute to the war effort must be protected against unnecessary destruction and hardship.

1.2.1. Law of War or Ius ad bellum

The main legal remedy of ius ad bellum (Latin locution meaning justice for war) derives from the UN Charter, which states in its:

1. Art. 2.4 that: ‘The Members of the Organisation shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’, i.e. that, strictly speaking, states should not resort to war.
2. And in Article 51 that ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations (…)’. However, this Article 51 cannot be invoked by Israel in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, precisely because of that situation of occupation since 1967, as confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion of 9 July 2004, when it concluded that the wall built by Israel on occupied Palestinian territory in the West Bank was illegal. And while Israel has invoked its right to war against Hamas on the basis of Article 51 repeatedly throughout its incursions into Gaza since 2008, not only the ICJ but most scholars in the field agree that Israel has no legal basis to invoke Article 51 in its armed confrontations with Hamas.

In moral theory (one of the pillars of natural law) there are at least three approaches to the question of war:

1. Pacifism, according to which all war is unjustified and therefore immoral.
2. The approach of political realism or realpolitik, whose fundamental premise was laid down by the German military historian Carl von Clausewitz, when he said that war is just another form of politics.
3. And finally, there is the just war tradition, which originated in the Middle Ages and is characterised by the defence that some warfare is justified and moral.

1.2.2. International humanitarian law or Ius in bello

International humanitarian law (IHL) is a branch of public international law (PIL) that seeks to mitigate and limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting persons who do not take part in hostilities or who have chosen not to take part in the fighting; it restricts and regulates the means and methods of warfare available to combatants; and it regulates conduct in armed conflict (ius in bello: Latin for justice in war).

IHL is essentially contained in the Geneva Conventions (GC) of 12 August 1949, the so-called ‘Geneva law’, to which almost all UN Member States are party, and which is composed of four conventions:

1. The First Geneva Convention, comprising the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field of 1864, updated in the subsequent conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949.
2.  The Second Geneva Convention, comprising the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Servicemen Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked in Armed Forces at Sea of 1906, as updated by the following conventions of 1929 and 1949.
3. The Third Geneva Convention, comprising the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field and the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, both 1929, updated in the following 1949 convention.
4. The Fourth Geneva Convention, comprising the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

Both Israel and Palestine have ratified all four Geneva Conventions.

These Conventions were supplemented by two further treaties, two Additional Protocols (I and II) of 1977, concerning the protection of victims of armed conflict; and an Additional Protocol (III) of 2005 concerning emblems. Palestine acceded to all three Protocols and Israel only to Protocol III.

Alongside the four GCs would be the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, known as ‘Hague law’, and their Regulations, which are essentially practical law applicable to soldiers in combat and which: set the rules for conducting operations; set out how operations should be conducted, specifying, for example, what may be attacked and how it should be attacked; give rules limiting the destructive effects of combat so as not to exceed what is actually necessary to achieve the objective or military mission.

Modern laws of war in relation to the conduct of war (ius in bello), such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, provide, among other things, that:

• The prohibition of attacking medics, ambulances or hospital ships displaying a Red Cross, Red Crescent, Magen David Adom or other emblems related to the International Red Cross.
• Shooting at persons or vehicles carrying a white flag is also prohibited, as it indicates an intention to surrender or a desire to communicate.
• Soldiers who violate specific provisions of the laws of war lose the protection and status they offer as prisoners of war, but only after facing a competent tribunal (Third Geneva Convention Art. 5). At that point they become unlawful combatants, but they must still be treated humanely and, in case of trial, they will not be deprived of the rights to a fair and impartial trial, because they are still covered by the Fourth Geneva Convention Art. 5.
• After the conflict is over, persons who have committed or ordered the breaking of the laws of war, especially atrocities, can be held personally responsible for war crimes through the process of law. In addition, nations that have signed the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to seek out, and then prosecute and punish, anyone who has committed or ordered certain ‘grave breaches’ of the laws of war (see GC III, art 129 and art 130).

Spies and terrorists may be subject to civilian law or military tribunals for their acts and in practice have been subjected to torture and/or execution. The laws of war neither condone nor condemn such acts, which are outside their scope. However, nations that have signed the 1984 UN Convention against Torture have pledged not to use torture on any person for any reason whatsoever. Israel is a State party to this Convention. In any case, the 18 Human Rights Conventions, of which this one is a part, will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3 below.

There are also other texts that protect certain categories of persons or property:

• The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols;
• The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

Finally, there would be a number of multilateral treaties and instruments within the field of disarmament, which aim to regulate and restrict the use of certain weapons, or eliminate them altogether, and in the gestation of which the UN has played an important role. These include:

• 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
• 1975 Bacteriological (biological) Weapons Convention.
• 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its five Protocols:

1. Protocol I restricts non-detectable weapons of fragmentation.
2. Protocol II restricts landmines and booby traps.
3. Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons.
4. Protocol IV of 1995 restricts blinding laser weapons
5. Protocol V of 2003 establishes obligations and best practices for the clearance of explosive remnants of war.

• 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
• 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
• 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.
• 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.
• 2013 Arms Trade Treaty.
• 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

Israel, despite being in possession of nuclear weapons since the 1960s, has never signed the NPT, nor the TPNW; and it has signed the CTBT, but has not ratified it. Nor has it signed agreements on biological weapons, anti-personnel mines or cluster munitions. On the other hand, Israel has signed, but not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Arms Trade Treaty. Finally, with regard to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Israel has ratified the Convention, but not the Protocols. Nevertheless, Israel must comply with the norms of Protocols I and II, which are part of customary international law and are therefore binding on all parties to an armed conflict. In short, Israel’s performance in this area is very poor: it has ratified only one agreement (but none of the five protocols to that agreement) of the nine international agreements on disarmament and arms control which exist.

1.2.3. Ius post bellum

Ius post bellum (Latin for justice after the war) is a concept that deals with morality in the phase of ending war, including the responsibility to rebuild. The idea has some historical background as a concept in just war theory. In modern times, it has been developed by various just war theorists and international lawyers.

1.3. International human rights law

International human rights law (IHRL) is a branch of public international  law (PIL) developed to promote and protect human rights at the international, regional and national levels. Accordingly, IHRL sets out the obligations that States must respect. Thus, when a state becomes a party to international treaties of this kind, it is assigned obligations and duties to respect, protect and fulfil human rights (HR). The duty to respect refers to a negative, non-intervention obligation, meaning that states must refrain from interfering with or limiting the enjoyment of human rights. On the other hand, the obligation to protect them indicates a positive obligation, which implies state intervention in order to prevent HRs violations against individuals and groups. Finally, the obligation to realise them obliges states to adopt positive measures to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.

As a branch of international human rights law, it is composed of a number of binding international instruments, in particular various human rights treaties, and international custom.

1. The following set of human rights instruments, proclaimed by the United Nations at various times, is known as the International Bill of Human Rights:

1.1. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the UNGA by Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.

1.2. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ICESCR ), adopted by UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976.

1.3 . The Optional Protocols thereto (the 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; the 1989 Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty; and the 2008 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR).

1.4. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 in Paris. The UDHR has the character of customary international law, as it constitutes guidelines to be followed. Although it is frequently cited in the basic laws or constitutions of many countries and in other national legislation, it does not have the status of an international agreement or international treaty.

The two International Covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) are binding agreements that elaborate on the UDHR; that translate the rights contained therein into legal obligations; and that establish bodies to monitor compliance by States parties. These two Covenants are also known as the New York Covenants.

2. A number of international treaties that are binding only on the States that have ratified them, such as:

2.1. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted in 1948).

2.2 . The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted in 1965).

2.3 . The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted in 1979) and its 1999 Protocol.

2.4. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun ishment (adopted in 1984) and its 2002 Protocol.

2.5. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 1989) and its 3 Optional Protocols: (a) Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 2000; (b) Sale, Prostitution and Pornography of Children 2000; and (c) Communication Procedures 2011.

2.6. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted in 1990).

2.7. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted in 2006) and its 2006 Protocol.

2.8. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted in 2010).

In total, there are 18 instruments between human rights treaties and their respective protocols. The total number of instruments that a country has ratified says a lot about its level of respect for human rights. Thus, Spain has ratified 17 of the 18 instruments, whereas Israel has ratified only 9: ICCPR, ICESCR, Genocide, Racial Discrimination, Discrimination against Women, Torture, Child and 2 of its 3 Protocols (a and b), Disability, but it is not a State party to: the two Protocols to ICCPR (the second being particularly important, aimed at abolishing the death penalty), nor the Protocol to ICESCR, nor the Protocol on Discrimination against Women, nor Protocol c on the Child, nor the Conventions on Migrant Workers, nor the Convention on Protection from Enforced Disappearance. In relation to the permanent members of the UNSC, four of them perform poorly in terms of ratification of these treaties (theUK has ratified only 13, Russia 11, China 8 and the US 5), and only France has ratified 17.

The body in charge of monitoring respect for human rights around the world was, between 1946 and 2006, the Commission on Human Rights, which was replaced in 2006 by the Human Rights Council (HRC), an intergovernmental body within the UN system, composed of 47 states responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights worldwide. It has the capacity to discuss various thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year. It meets at the UN office in Geneva.

The main mechanism of the HRC is the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) which requires each UN Member State to undergo a review of its human rights performance every four and a half years. The UPR periodically provides each State with the opportunity to:

• Report on the measures it has taken to improve the human rights situation in the country and to overcome challenges to the enjoyment of human rights; and
• Receive recommendations – based on input from numerous stakeholders and previous reports – developed by other Member States, with a view to further improvement.

Established in March 2006 by UN General Assembly resolution 60/251, the UPR was designed to advance, support and expand the promotion and protection of human rights in all countries. Since the first UPR in 2008, all UN Member States have undergone the review three times. The fourth cycle of reviews began in November 2022, during the 41st session of the UPR Working Group.

The following link (https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/il-index) provides access to all the documents of Israel’s successive UPRs, the fourth and last one so far was in May 2023. It is particularly interesting to read the short fifteen-page document entitled ‘Compilation of information prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ of 15 February 2023, which clearly reflects Israel’s continued violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people, as well as the racist bias of Israeli policies. A multitude of documents (reports, press releases, statements, speeches, etc.), strongly criticising Israel’s actions towards Palestine in terms of human rights, can be found on this website.

2. Historical and legal foundations of the dispute

The existence of Israel found its legal basis, at the time of its establishment, in three consecutive documents, on whose legal legitimacy the PIL professors Mesa Garrido and Iglesias Velasco vigorously disagree. The analysis of these three documents is based on two reference works: (1) ‘Fundamentos históricos y jurídicos del derecho a la autodeterminación del pueblo palestino’ published in the ‘Revista de Estudios Internacionales’, vol. 2, nº 1, 1981, pp. 5-43. 5-43, and specifically this point on pages 18-19, by Roberto Mesa Garrido, former Professor of PIL and International Relations at the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), already deceased; and (2) ‘El proceso de paz en Palestina’ published in Ediciones Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), 2000, and specifically this point on pages 17-37, by Alfonso Iglesias Velasco, current Professor of PIL at the UAM. The reference to the Palestinian jurist Henry Cattan is taken from the latter book, specifically page 36, who in turn consulted Cattan’s work: ‘Palestine and International Law. The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Longman, London, 1973, p. 85.

2.1. The Balfour Declaration

The Balfour Declaration (a brief letter of 2/11/1917 from the then British Foreign Secretary to Baron Rotschield, committing himself to the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine) is illegal on three grounds:

1. The UK was committing itself to dispose of a territory over which, at the time of the issuance of the Declaration, November 1917, it had no legal bond or power of disposal whatsoever, since that territory then belonged to the Ottoman Empire.
2. The British Government was addressing, as the addressee of its undertaking, a British citizen who did not represent the Jewish community and who, therefore, could not enjoy any legitimacy in international law to claim the fulfilment of such an undertaking.
3. The political will of the majority of the population of Palestine, which at the time was non-Jewish, was being ignored, for the above Declaration claimed to respect ‘the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities existing in Palestine’, but skilfully omitted any reference to political rights, the most important of which is that of their self-determination as a people exercising sovereign title over the Palestinian territory. In fact, this population was never consulted on their will to create a nation.

Although authors such as Feinberg supported the validity of this Declaration on the basis of: (1) art. 80 of the UN Charter, which refers to peoples as recipients of rights; and (2) the ICJ case law on the legal value of unilateral acts in 1933 in the case on the ‘legal status of East Greenland’; the Spanish professors mentioned above consider that ‘the legal value of this Declaration is null and void’, since by virtue of it the United Kingdom claims to dispose of a territory over which it had no sovereign legal title, since only the Palestinian people residing there had the right to dispose of its destiny.

In fact, this Declaration was clarified by the British government itself in Churchill’s Declaration to the Zionist Organisation of 3 June 1922.

2.2. The Palestine Mandate

Nor did the Palestine Mandate of 24 July 1922 grant the UK any title to territorial sovereignty, as its role as mandatary was limited to the temporary guardianship of the people of Palestine (Articles 22(1) and (2) of the LoN Covenant).

Art. 22.4 of the LoN Pact stated that ‘certain communities, which once belonged to the Ottoman Empire, have reached such a stage of development that their existence as independent nations may be provisionally recognised on condition that the advice and assistance of a Mandatory shall guide their administration until such time as they are capable of directing themselves’. This clause enshrined the territorial sovereignty of the Palestinian people and recognised their right to become an independent nation.

In light of the above, arts. 2, 4 and 6 of the British Mandate, which pronounced on the ‘establishment of the Jewish national home’, granted a right of disposition over a colonial territory that was not theirs by disregarding the political rights of the majority of the Palestinian population, in clear violation of the letter and spirit of art. 22. 4, making both the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate incompatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations, thus rendering its commitments and obligations abrogated and of no legal force whatsoever in accordance with Article 20 of the Covenant, which states that: ‘1. The Members of the League recognise… that the present Covenant abrogates all obligations and agreements inter se inconsistent with its terms…’.

2.3. Resolution 181 (II)

The validity of UNGA resolution (res.) 181 (II) of 29/11/1947 establishing the Partition Plan of Palestine into two sovereign and independent states is challenged on the grounds that the disposition by the UN of a non-self-governing territory without taking into account the will and legitimate rights of the majority of its inhabitants (which at that time was the Palestinian population) violates arts. 73 and 80 of the UN Charter and, therefore, this resolution violates the constitutive treaty of the UN and the international legal order itself, since the principle of self-determination recognises the right of all peoples, including the Palestinian people, to see their national unity and the integrity of their territory respected.

In short, in addition to the lack of any legal basis in international law for its proclamation as a state as described above, the jurist Henry Cattan adds two other illegitimities on which Israel was built: the usurpation of political power and the seizure of territory.

2.4. The uneven implementation of Resolution 181 (II)

2.4.1. Israel was admitted as early as 1949 as a member state of the UN

Despite the questionable legal legitimacy of the three documents on which Israel bases its existence, and the fact that its Declaration of Independence was unilateral, the fact remains that Israel was admitted as a member state of the UN in 1949 by UNGA resolution 273 (III) UNGA of 11/05/1949, UNGA Resolution 273 (III) of 11/05/1949, preambular paragraph 5 of which states how Israel had previously committed itself to the ad hoc Political Committee to implement UNGA Resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III), the former limiting Israel’s territory to that shown on its annexed maps, and implying acceptance that the holy sites in Jerusalem would be under UN control; and the second included the right of return and/or reparations for the 1948 Palestinian refugees, which Israel considered ‘should be examined and resolved within the framework of comprehensive negotiations for the establishment of peace in Palestine’, an issue which Israel has still not seen fit to address 75 years later. Israel must not delay any longer in fulfilling all the commitments it made from the moment it joined the UN.

As of 28/05/2024, of the 193 UN member states, 164 recognise Israel.

2.4.2. Palestine has not yet been admitted as a UN member state.

In contrast, the process of recognition of the Palestinian side is proving arduous and slow:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), created in 1964, was recognised as:

• Representative of the Palestinian people by UNGA resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22/11/1974.
• Observer at the UN by UNGA resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22/11/1974.
• And was authorised by the UNSC to participate as a non-voting observer on 12/1/1976.

2. Following the proclamation, also unilaterally, of the State of Palestine in Algiers in 1988 by the Palestinian National Council under UNGA res. 181 (II), UNGA res. 43/177 of 15/12/1988, decides that from that day onwards the designation ‘Palestine’ will be used in the UN instead of PLO.

3. On 23/09/2012, the Palestinian president submitted to the then UNSG a request for Palestine to be considered a full member of the UN, the 194th member (and this was the name of the diplomatic campaign developed to gather support). The UNGA adopted res. 67/19 of 29/11/2012 recognising Palestine as a non-member observer state. The US vetoed on 18/04/2024 a resolution submitted by Algeria proposing the admission of Palestine as a full member of the UN.

4. On 10/05/2024 the UNGA voted on a resolution that was approved by 143 countries, with 9 voting against and 25 abstentions, which allowed Palestine’s status in the UN to be improved (voting not at the end but in alphabetical order, voting at international conferences, etc.). Even so, it still does not imply full membership in the UN.

5. As of 21/06/2024, out of the 193 UN member states, 145 recognise Palestine.

3. Main UN resolutions

The United Nations has passed a large number of resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of which we will focus on a limited number that are considered particularly relevant, most of them already historically contextualised in the ‘Brief Chronology’, and which establish:

(a) Principles by which the final solution to the conflict should be governed:

1. Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied (TTOO) in the 1967 war, including Jerusalem. Included, inter alia, in UNSC resolution 242 of 22/11/1967 (operative paragraph. 1.i); UNSC res. 471 of 5/06/1980 (op. par. 6); or UNSC res. 476 of 30/06/1980 (op. par. 1).

2. Termination of all situations of belligerency. Included, inter alia, in UNSC res. 242 (op. par. 1. ii), which together with the previous point has become known as the principle of ‘peace by territory’.

3. Non-recognition of any change to the boundary lines of 4 June 1967 unless agreed by the parties. Included, among others, in UNSC res. 2334 of 23/12/2016 (op. par. 3).

4. Negotiation between the parties to establish a just peace. Included, inter alia, in UNSCR res. 338 of 22/10/2016 (op. par. 3).

(b) The rights of the Palestinian people:

5. Right of Palestinian refugees, expelled after the 1948 war, to return to their homes and/or to be compensated. This is enshrined, inter alia, in UNGA res. 194 (III) of 11/12/1948 (op. par. 11); and, extended to 1967, to a just solution UNSC res. 242 (op. par. 2.b).

6. Recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people as an indispensable condition for a just and lasting peace. Recovered, inter alia, in UNGA res. 2628 (XXV) of 4/11/1970 (op. par. 3).

7. Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people. Included, inter alia, in UNGA res. 34/44 of 23/11/1979 (preambular paragraph 6, op. par. 3 and 14); and its recourse to armed struggle: UNGA res. 34/44 (op. par. 2).

8. Support for Palestine as a state. Included, among others, in UNSC res. 1397 of 12/03/2002 (pream. par. 2); UNSC res. 1515 of 19/11/2003 (pream. par. 4); UNSC res. 2720 of 22/12/2023 (op. par. 12).

(c) Israel’s obligations:

9. End Israeli settlements in TTOOs that are considered illegal. Included, inter alia, in UNSC res. 471 (op. par. 5); UNSC res. 2334 (pream. par. 4 and 5; op. par. 1 and 2).

10. Halt the construction of the wall and repair all damage caused by its construction. Taken up in the ICJ opinion of 9/7/2004, as reflected in UNGA res. ES-10/273 of 13/7/2004 (para. 163).

11. Respect and comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. As reflected, inter alia, in UNSC res. 471 (op. par. 4).

12. Respect the human rights of the Palestinian population. Included, inter alia, in UNGA res. 77/247 of 30/12/2022 (op. par. 2).

Below is a table presenting the above resolutions in chronological order and with the text of the suggested paragraphs, although the full resolution can be accessed by clicking on the hyperlink in the ‘number’ column:

 

DATE	NUMBER	BODY	THEMATIC AND/OR MOST RELEVANT PARTS
29/11/1947	181 (II)	UNGA	Details the 2-State Partition Scheme
11/12/1948	194 (III)	UNGA	Operative paragraph (op. par.) 11: “Resolves that refugees who wish to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be allowed to do so as soon as possible, and that compensation should be paid by way of indemnity for the property of those who choose not to return to their homes and for any property lost or damaged where, in accordance with the principles of international law or for reasons of equity, such loss or damage should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;”
22/11/1967	242	UNSC	Op. par. 1.i: “Withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the territories they occupied during the recent conflict;” [6-Day War]. Op. par. 1.ii: “Termination of all situations of belligerency or allegations of their existence, and respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised borders and free from threat or force;” Op. par. 2.b: “Affirms further the need to: (b) Achieve a just solution to the refugee problem;”
4/11/1970	2628 (XXV)	UNGA	Op. par. 3: “Recognises that respect for the rights of Palestinians is an indispensable element for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.
22/10/1973	338	UNSC	Op. par. 3: “Decides that, immediately and simultaneously with the ceasefire, negotiations shall commence between the parties concerned, under appropriate auspices, aimed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East”.
23/11/1979	34/44	UNGA	Preambular paragraph (pream. par.) 6: “Whereas the activities of Israel, in particular the denial to the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination and independence, constitute a serious and growing threat to international peace and security,” Op. par. 2: “Reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples’ struggle for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign occupation and alien occupation by all means at their disposal, including armed struggle”. Op. par. 3: “Reaffirms the inalienable right… of the Palestinian people and all peoples under colonial and foreign domination to self-determination, national independence, territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty without foreign interference;” Op. par. 14: “Further condemns Israel’s expansionist activities as well as the continued bombardment of Arab civilian populations, especially Palestinian civilians, and the destruction of their villages and camps, which constitutes a serious obstacle to the realization of the self-determination and independence of the Palestinian people”.
5/06/1980	471	UNSC	Op. par. 4: “Calls once again upon the Government of Israel to respect and comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, as well as the relevant Security Council resolutions; Op. par. 5: “Calls once again upon all States not to provide any assistance to Israel that could be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;” Op. par. 6: “Reaffirms the imperative need to bring an end to the prolonged occupation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;”
30/06/1980	476	UNSC	Op. par. 1: “Reaffirms the imperative need to bring an end to the prolonged occupation of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;”
12/03/2002	1397	UNSC	Pream. par. 2: “Supporting the concept of a region in which two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders,”
19/11/2003	1515	UNSC	Pream. par. 4: “Reaffirming its vision of a region in which two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders”.
13/07/2004	EN-10/273	UNGA	ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall, para. 163 (p. 59): “A. The construction of the wall being erected by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, is contrary to international law; B. Israel is under an obligation to cease its violations of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the construction of the wall …; C. Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory …”
23/12/2016	2334	UNSC	Pream. par. 4: “Condemning all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, including, inter alia, the construction and expansion of settlements, the transfer of Israeli settlers, the confiscation of land, the demolition of homes and the displacement of Palestinian civilians, in violation of international humanitarian law and relevant resolutions, ” Pream. par. 5: “Expressing grave concern that the continuation of Israeli settlement activities are endangering the viability of the two-State solution based on the 1967 borders,” Op. par. 1: “Reaffirms that the establishment of settlements by Israel in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a comprehensive, just and lasting peace;” Op. par. 2: “Reiterates its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it comply fully with all its legal obligations in this regard;” Op. par. 3: “Stresses that it will not recognise any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations;”
20/12/2022	77/247	UNGA	Op. par. 2: “Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, cease in the Occupied Palestinian Territory all measures contrary to international law, as well as discriminatory laws, policies and actions, resulting in the violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people, in particular those causing death and injury among the civilian population, the arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians, the forcible displacement of civilians, including attempts to forcibly transfer Bedouin communities, the transfer of their own population into the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the destruction and confiscation of civilian property, including home demolitions, and those carried out as an act of collective punishment in violation of international humanitarian law, and any obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and that fully respects the law of the rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to freedom of movement and the right to self-determination, and to comply with its legal obligations in this regard, in particular in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions.” Op. par. 18: “Decides, in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Charter, to request the ICJ, pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, to give an advisory opinion on the following questions…. (a) What are the legal consequences of Israel’s continued violation of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, its prolonged occupation, settlement and annexation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 1967, including measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and Israel’s adoption of related discriminatory legislation and measures? (b) How do Israel’s policies and practices referred to in paragraph 18(a) affect the legal status of the occupation and what are the legal implications of that status for all states and for the UN?”
22/12/2023	2720	UNSC	Op. par. 12.: “Reiterates its unwavering commitment to the aspiration for the two-state solution that will allow two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, to live side by side in peace within secure and recognised borders, in accordance with international law and relevant United Nations resolutions,…”.

The ICJ, on the basis of operative point 18 of resolution A/77/247, cited in the table, on the legal consequences of the occupation, i.e. on the unlawfulness of the Israeli occupation and the obligation to withdraw, heard the parties between 19 and 26 February 2024. The ICJ issued its advisory opinion on 19 July 2024. In an 83-page document detailing all the unlawfulnesses committed by Israel against the Palestinian territory and population since 1967, on page 80 of the opinion (downloadable at: https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20240719-adv-01-00-en.pdf), in point 285, the ICJ’s advisory opinion can be found containing nine points:

1. Finds that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested;
2. Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;
3. Is of the opinion that the State of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) is unlawful;
4. Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the OPT as rapidly as possible;
5. Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the OPT;
6. Is of the opinion that the State of Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned in the OPT;
7. Is of the opinion that all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the OPT and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence of the State of Israel in the OPT;
8. Is of the opinion that international organizations, including the United Nations, are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the OPT;
9. Is of the opinion that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, which requested this opinion, and the Security Council, should consider the precise modalities and further action required to bring to an end as rapidly as possible the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the OPT.

This is the first time that the ICJ has ruled specifically on the unlawfulness of Israel’s occupation, and reinforces what is already contained in UNSC resolutions such as 471 or 2334. The key is what to do differently this time in order to get Israel to truly end its unlawful occupation of the OPT.

4. The Israeli-Palestinian treaty framework

It was not until the 1991 Madrid Conference that Israel and Palestine began to negotiate directly, both through public channels that continued in Washington (USA) and through secret channels that took place in Oslo (Norway). The result of these direct contacts is a web of agreements between the parties, most of which are governed by international law, specifically treaty law, which should ensure compliance with the obligations arising from them.

The agreements signed by Israel and Palestine are listed below, although there are two key ones, the 1993 Declaration of Principles (the one cited in this enumeration as 4.2, Oslo I) and the 1995 Interim Agreement (in 4.8, Oslo II):

4.1. Mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO

On 9/09/1993 an exchange of letters of mutual recognition took place between the then Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzak Rabin, and the then PLO leader, Yasser Arafat:

1. Israel recognises the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

2. Palestine goes beyond mere recognition and, in addition, accepts UNSC resolutions 242 and 338; renounces terrorism and other acts of violence; and declares null and void the clauses in the Palestinian National Charter that denied Israel’s right to exist.

Previously, on 19/01/1993, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, had repealed a 1986 law that barred Israeli citizens from contact with the PLO, which it considered a terrorist organisation.

4.2. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government

On 13/09/1993 the Declaration of Principles (hereafter, DP) was signed in Washington between Israel and the PLO consisting of 17 articles and four annexes: (I) modalities and conditions for elections; (II) withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho; (III) cooperation in economic and development programmes; (IV) cooperation in regional programmes. It is also known as Oslo I. Strictly speaking, it was a framework agreement setting out principles that were to guide the subsequent stages of negotiations; and, again, a declaration of principles is a political agreement, not an international agreement governed by treaty law and creating legal obligations for the parties.

The central objective stated in its Art. 1 was ‘the establishment of an interim Palestinian autonomy authority, the elected council of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding 5 years and leading to a permanent settlement based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338’.

This Declaration had very few enforceable obligations from its entry into force: begin preparatory transfers of powers and responsibilities from Israel to Palestine (Art. 6); establishment of the Joint Liaison Committee (Art. 10) and the Economic Cooperation Committee (Art. 11); and the obligation to withdraw Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza outside the inhabited areas (Art. 13).

This Declaration was clearly favourable to Israel as, in the face of ambiguous concessions on the withdrawal of forces, the Palestinians postponed key issues such as the origin of settlements; the legal status of Jerusalem; the return of refugees; the fate of political prisoners in Israeli jails; and private property claims.

Its main flaw is that it did not establish any mechanism to induce the recalcitrant side to negotiate. Thus, many of the deadlines in the PD’s ambitious timetable were not met.

Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into negotiations on the interim agreement, which took place in three main phases (agreements in 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8).

4.3. The Security Agreement on Borders and on Settlements in Gaza

On 9/04/1994 a security agreement was signed between Israel and the PLO whereby the borders between Jericho and Jordan and between Gaza and Egypt, as well as three areas of Israeli settlements in Gaza remained under exclusive Israeli control.

4.4. The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations

On 29/04/1994, an 11-article Protocol on Economic Relations was signed in Paris between Israel and the PLO; it addressed: establishment and regulation of a Joint Economic Committee; import policy and taxation; monetary and financial matters; direct taxation; indirect taxation on local production; labour; agriculture; industry; tourism; and insurance. This Protocol was incorporated into successive agreements.

4.5. The Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area

This agreement was signed in Cairo on 4/5/1994 between Israel and the PLO to articulate Annex II of the PD, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho (in the West Bank), and consisted of 23 very detailed articles and 4 extensive annexes: (I) withdrawal of the Israeli army and security provisions including a detailed structure and composition of the Palestinian police; (II) civil affairs; (III) legal issues in both criminal and civil matters; (IV) economic relations [the latter was an authentic copy of the Paris Protocol of 29/04/1994].

This agreement entered into force on the day it was signed and that was the day on which the provisional period of 5 years provided for in Art. 5.1 of the PD began to run (Art. 23.3).

The main shortcomings of this agreement would be:

– On the one hand, that it consolidates important limitations to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA), such as:

• By excluding Israeli citizens from the jurisdiction of the PA , it creates two different legal regimes in the same territory, one for Israelis subject only to Israeli law, and another applicable to Palestinians, subordinated both to the PA and to the powers of the Israeli army, including its 1100 military orders.
• Israel and its armed forces have the right of free passage on Palestinian roads.
• Israel is allowed some control over the legal provisions adopted by the PA, which must also comply with the agreements.

– It includes abusive clauses, such as Article 22, whereby the PA assumes full financial responsibility for actions or omissions that occurred prior to the transfer of authority, exempting Israel from paying compensation for, for example, illegal tax collection, destruction of property or expropriation of resources. The same clause was replicated in the Preliminary Transfer Agreement (Art. 9) and the Interim Agreement (Art. 20).

4.6. The Agreement on Preliminary Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

On 29/08/1994 it was signed in Erez between Israel and the PLO in implementation of Art. 6 of the PD and was structured in 13 articles and 6 annexes, each annex containing a Protocol corresponding to each of the six areas to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and listing the Israeli regulations in the field taken over by the PA, namely: (I) education and culture; (II) health; (III) social welfare; (IV) tourism; (V) direct taxation; (VI) VAT on local production.

The main shortcomings of this agreement would be:

– Having an asymmetrical regulation between the Cairo Agreement and this one, the emerging Palestinian Council was to have much broader powers in Gaza and Jericho than in the rest of the West Bank, which is in blatant contradiction with the consideration of Gaza and the West Bank as an indivisible territorial unit.

– The agreed preliminary autonomy was too limited and insufficient for it to be properly developed:

• The territory under the PA’s competence was too restricted;
• The material and personal exceptions to its jurisdiction were too broad for it to succeed, and the contrast between the signs of sovereignty achieved and the day-to-day reality remained a source of impotence for PA officials and frustration for the Palestinian population.

4.7. Protocol on the Transfer of Additional Powers and Responsibilities

On 27/08/1995 an additional protocol was signed in Cairo between Israel and the PLO, consisting of 9 articles and 8 annexes, each annex containing specific provisions for those additional matters being transferred [and although the annexes were unnumbered here a number is prefixed for clarification purposes], namely: (I) labour; (II) trade and industry; (III) gas, oil and petrol; (IV) insurance; (V) postal services; (VI) statistics and census; (VII) local government; and (VIII) agriculture.

4.8. Interim or Interim Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

An Interim Agreement was initialled in Taba on 24/09/1995 and signed in Washington on 28/09/1995 between Israel and the PLO consisting of 31 articles; seven extensive annexes including protocols on: (I) disengagement and security arrangements; (II) elections; (III) civil affairs; (IV) legal affairs; (V) economic relations [again included slightly modified copy of the Paris Agreement of 29704/1994]; (VI) Israeli-Palestinian cooperation programme; (VII) release of detainees and political prisoners; and 8 maps. It is also known as the Taba or Oslo II Agreement.

This agreement regulated in its Article 3 and Annex II the elections of the residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem to the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority consisting of two bodies: (1) a Palestinian Council with 82 members; and (2) a Head of the Council’s Executive Authority or Rais. The transitional period for which they would be elected would be no more than 5 years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho agreement, i.e. May 1999 (art. 3.4); and permanent status negotiations would start as soon as possible, but no later than 4/05/1996, and should cover outstanding issues: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations with neighbours (art. 31.5).

The agreement also provided for the establishment in the West Bank of 3 territorial areas, each subject to a different jurisdictional regime:

1. Area A: comprised 6 of the 7 main West Bank cities (Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus, Kalkilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem), but not Hebron, which would be placed under the civilian control of the PA who would also be responsible for public order and general security. This area covered 200 square kilometres (4% of the West Bank) and affected 250,000 people.
2. Area B: comprised most of the 460 Palestinian villages in the West Bank, with the PA assuming civilian responsibilities and law and order, and Israel maintaining general security. This area accounted for 23% of the West Bank and would affect 68% of the Palestinian population.
3. Area C: comprised most of the West Bank’s rural hinterland, the then 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Israeli military installations, over which Israel retained law and order and general security functions until the end of permanent status negotiations.

This agreement, according to its Article 31.2, replaced: (1) the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (except for Article 20) – the agreement described in point 4.5; (2) the Transfers Agreement – point 4.6; and (3) the Additional Transfers Agreement – point 4.7.

The main flaws of this agreement would be:

• All those mentioned above in relation to the agreements it replaces.
• By establishing different legal regimes applicable to different areas of the territory, Israel achieved its undisguised goal of delaying PA control over the entire West Bank as long as possible, since Israel retained 73 per cent of the West Bank’s Palestinian land; 97 per cent of its security; and 80 per cent of its water resources.
• Although a system was successfully articulated to allow Palestinians in Jerusalem to participate in the elections (only Jerusalem residents with valid additional addresses in the West Bank or Gaza could participate and had to do so at polling stations outside Jerusalem), these limitations hindered the right to vote for a significant portion of the electorate.
• Although Art. 31.7 stated that the parties undertook ‘not to initiate or take any steps that would alter the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations’, the fact remains that Israeli settlers have continued to buildoutposts and expand settlements in the West Bank.
• Although Article 19 stated that both parties would ‘exercise powers and responsibilities in accordance with internationally accepted norms and principles of human rights and subject to the rule of law’, the fact is that there have been consistent violations of human rights.

The Interim Agreement and its seven annexes can be downloaded here: Interim Agreement and Annexes.

4.9. Protocol on the Hebron Withdrawal

On 17/01/1997, a Protocol on Israel’s partial withdrawal from Hebron, a Palestinian town with 450 settlers and 20,000 Palestinian inhabitants, was signed in Jerusalem between Israel and the PLO in application of Art. 7 of Annex I of the Interim Agreement. The PA assumed control of part of the city (H1), while Israel retained control of the Old City and other areas (H2).

In application of Art. 17 of this Protocol, an Additional Agreement was signed on 21/01/1997 for the deployment of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (PITH) to be led by Norway. Already in May 1994, following the Hebron massacre perpetrated by an Israeli settler on 25/02/1994, a first TIP had been deployed; and on 9/05/1996 a second agreement had been signed on a TIP which had been deployed that October.

4.10. Wye River Memorandum

On 23/10/1998 a US-sponsored agreement between Israel and the PLO was signed in Washington detailing a series of commitments and a timetable. Israel transferred additional parts of the West Bank (1% from C to A; 12% from C to B; and 14% from B to A) and committed to the third withdrawal. Palestine undertook to: prepare a counter-terrorism work plan including a joint US-Palestinian committee; control the Palestinian police and provide Israel with a list; convene its highest bodies to annul the points of the Palestinian National Charter incompatible with the peace agreements (this took place in Gaza on 14/12/1998). They also undertook to resume permanent status talks and not to take unilateral measures.

4.11. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum

On 4/09/1999 a document was signed in Sharm el-Sheikh committing to resume permanent status negotiations and to reach an agreement within one year of the resumption (art. 1.d); agreeing to additional withdrawals; release of prisoners; the creation of a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza; or the construction of a port in Gaza.

4.12. Protocol for safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip

A document was signed in Jerusalem on 5/10/1999 detailing the modalities for safe passage of both people and goods between the two Palestinian territories.

4.13. Trilateral Camp David Declaration

On 25/07/2000 a declaration was signed at Camp David (USA) by Israel, the PA and the US committing the parties to conclude an agreement on outstanding issues as soon as possible (point 2); avoiding unilateral action (point 3); and the US remaining a vital partner in the search for peace (point 5).

US negotiator Robert Malley debunked in a newspaper article the myths that blamed the Palestinians for the failure.

4.14. The Taba Joint Declaration

A joint declaration was signed in Taba on 27/01/2001 summarising the agreements reached during the previous six days of negotiations and calling for a resumption of negotiations after the Israeli legislative elections.

4.15. Gaza Crossings Agreements

On 15/11/2005 an Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing were signed, articulating the dynamics at the Gaza crossings. For their articulation the EU approved the EUBAM Rafah Mission.

4.16. Joint Understanding on the Annapolis Negotiations

On 27/11/2007 a joint understanding document was signed in Annapolis (USA) in which Israel and the PA agreed to resume final status negotiations and committed themselves to reaching an agreement before the end of 2008.

4.17. Aqaba Joint Communiqué

A joint communiqué was issued on 26/02/2023 following a meeting of Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian and US officials in Aqaba (Jordan) where it was agreed to refrain from unilateral measures for a few months and to undertake confidence-building measures for which a meeting was scheduled to take place in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt) in March.

The Israeli Prime Minister was quick to deny that he would refrain from initiating new settlement projects; and Israeli settlers hours later carried out violent actions in the West Bank village of Huwwara, killing one Palestinian and injuring a hundred.

4.18. Conclusion of Permanent Status Remains Pending

The agreements listed above were, by their nature, interim and only allowed for the establishment of limited Palestinian autonomy.

Although negotiations on permanent status began in Taba (Egypt) in May 1996, as foreseen in Art. 5.2 of the DP which stated that they should begin ‘no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period’, a period which started on the day of the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement in May 1994, they were never concluded ‘within the five-year transitional period’ foreseen in Art. 5.1 of the DP which was May 1999.

As stated in art. 5.3 of the DP -and endorsed by art. 31.5 of the Interim Agreement-: ‘ negotiations shall cover the remaining issues, including the following: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security issues, borders, cooperative relations with other neighbouring countries and other issues of common interest.”

If the parties reach agreement on the remaining issues and permanent status negotiations are concluded, a Palestinian state can be established on part of the territory of historic Palestine and will mark the end of the conflict.

What has prevented an end to the conflict?

The main reason, I believe, is that since the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995, there have been no politicians in power in Israel who have wanted to move towards permanent status, perhaps for fear of being assassinated by Zionist radicals as Rabin was; and the Israeli politicians who have been in power have clearly pursued the Zionist goal of ‘Greater Israel’, incompatible with a decisive move forward in negotiations. Here it is important to retain that the Israeli side is the strong side of the negotiating equation and the only one with full international recognition, so it has been Israel’s lack of political will for negotiations that has prevented them from moving forward.

None of the dates after May 1999 that have been set in the calendar for the conclusion of permanent status negotiations, such as the end of 2005 as set out in the 2002 Quartet Roadmap, or 2008 as set out in Annapolis,have been respected.

In the intervening 25 years, a pattern of behaviour by Israeli negotiators can be observed:

1. Accepting the start of negotiations (initially in 1996);
2. Recalcitrantly resisting making any concessions that would allow the negotiations to move forward;
3. And, in the meantime, to implement policies of fait accompli that ‘de facto’ prevent the achievement of any meaningful negotiation outcome and its successful conclusion.

On the part of Palestinian negotiators, neither Fatah’s pacifist strategy between 1991 and 1995 achieved results, nor Hamas’ strategy after winning the 2006 democratic elections (as Israel forced them out of power), nor the subsequent armed resistance by Hamas and other factions. In addition, on the Palestinian side, given that the two-state solution has in practice only led to more violence and to Israel building a wall and continuing to expand settlements and allow outposts, the Palestinian side (both its leadership and public opinion) has for many years lacked a single, united, cohesive and shared vision of the future, which further weakened its negotiating position. In contrast to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which continued to advocate a two-state solution, more and more voices were calling for a single, truly democratic state that would be home to both groups or for a Greater Palestine solution. On 23 July 2024, fourteen Palestinian factions signed the Chinese-mediated ‘Beijing Declaration’ to end their divisions and strengthen Palestinian national unity, which may mark a major turning point in the right direction.

5. Israel’s violation of the Palestinian people’s human rights

The USA jurist John B. Quigley described in detail in 1989 in his article ‘David v. Goliath: Humanitarian and Human Rights Law in Light of the Palestinian Right of Self-Determination and Right to Recapture territories taken by force’ (New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 489-525) the commission by Israel of serious and clear violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law of war, particularly evident during the First Intifada:

1. Israel’s use of force with ‘frankly excessive reprisals such as the use of firearms, indiscriminate firing of tear gas, physical beatings, arrests without formal charges (known as administrative detentions), house demolitions and expulsions… “is illegal under international law”, while the force used by Palestine is intended to give effect to the self-determination of its people and is protected by international law. Some of the measures taken by the Israeli government and army (shooting of demonstrators, physical abuse, curfews, imprisonment in degrading conditions, etc.) also violate humanitarian and human rights law.

2. The physical beating of Palestinians is strictly prohibited by various international legal instruments: Articles 31 and 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (IV GC); Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and Article 16 of the Convention against Torture.

3. Tear gas, the use of which during occupation is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of Asphyxiating Gases.

4. The mass arrest of demonstrators. Demonstrations are permitted under Art. 21 of the ICCPR, although restricted by Military Order 101 of 27-08-1967 and Military Order 718.

5. Detainees held in prison without charge or criminal proceedings (administrative detention), covered by Military Orders 378 of 1970 (arts. 84A and 87) and 815 of 1980 which contravenes Art. 9.2. of the ICCPR which states that everyone must be informed at the time of arrest of the reasons and promptly notified of the charge; and Art. 9.4. of the ICCPR which states that ‘he shall have the right to a remedy before a court’, rules which have become general customary international law and binding on all states, whether or not they are parties to the ICCPR, although Israel has ratified the ICCPR.

6. Detention of thousands of Palestinians in degrading conditions in violation of Articles 81, 85, 89 and 135 of IV GC.

7. Deportations in violation of Art. 49 of IV GC and condemned by the UN (UNSC Resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988) and 799 (1992).

8. Demolition of houses, which is illegal under Art. 53 of IV GC.

9. Curfews, permitted under international humanitarian law to pacify urgent crises, but their prolongation is not authorised as it would be collective punishment proscribed by Art. 33 of IV GC.

10. Interference with freedom of the press through arrest or administrative detention of journalists and closure of newspapers and regular interruption of telephone communications violates Art. 19 ICCPR.

11. Preventing the wounded from receiving adequate medical treatment in violation of the basic human rights enshrined in Art. 55 of IV GC.

12. Despite Israel’s obligation to maintain public life, according to Art. 64 of the IV GC, Israel has decreed the closure of political and social institutions.

13. Appropriation by Israel of private lands in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, since the 1967 Allon Plan, which is prohibited by Art. 46 of the Hague Regulations.

14. The Jewishsettlement policy in the West Bank violates Art. 49 IV GC and is clearly contrary to the PIL.

Quigley considers Israel’s own domestic legal system as enshrining a true apartheid system.

On 5 April 2024, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted the important resolution 55/30, with 9 substantive points:

1. Reaffirms the inalienable, permanent and unqualified right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including their right to live in freedom, justice and dignity and their right to an independent State of Palestine;

2. Also reaffirms the need to achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in accordance with international law and other internationally agreed parameters, including all relevant United Nations resolutions;

3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to immediately end its occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and to revoke and remove all impediments to the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Palestine, and reaffirms its support for the two-State solution of Palestine and Israel living side by side in peace and security;

4. Expresses grave concern at any action taken in contravention of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions related to Jerusalem;

5. Expresses grave concern also at the fragmentation and changes in the demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, resulting from the continuing construction and expansion of settlements, the forced transfer of Palestinians and the construction of the wall by Israel, stresses that this fragmentation, which undermines the ability of the Palestinian people to realize their right to self-determination, is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and emphasizes in this regard the need for respect for and preservation of the territorial unity, contiguity and integrity of the entire Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem;

6. Confirms that the right of the Palestinian people to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources should be exercised for the benefit of national development and the well-being of the Palestinian people and for the realization of their right to self-determination;

7. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations of non-recognition, non-aid and non-assistance with regard to Israel’s grave breaches of peremptory norms of international law, in particular the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force, in order to ensure the exercise of the right to self-determination, and also calls upon them to continue to cooperate to bring about, by lawful means, the cessation of these grave breaches and the reversal of Israel’s illegal policies and practices;

8. Urges all States to take the necessary steps to promote the realization of the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and to assist the United Nations in the performance of its Charter-mandated tasks with regard to the observance of this right;

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Likewise, HRC resolution 55/32 condemns Israel’s continuation of settlement activities and demands their cessation.

6. The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian issue

On the economic and trade side, the EU signed an Association Agreement with Israel in 1995, which entered into force in 2000; and an Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation with Palestine, signed specifically with the PLO, in 1997. In 2011 the EU and the Palestinian Authority signed an Additional Liberalisation Agreement on agriculture and fisheries. The EU and its Member States are also together the largest donor of funds to Palestine.

Politically, the EU has supported and continues to support the fulfilment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and Israel’s right to its existence and security (Venice Declaration of 1980), as well as the need to promote peace negotiations (Madrid Declaration of 1989) with an explicit commitment to the creation of the Palestinian state (Berlin Declaration of 1999) leading to a definitive solution for which it offers parameters [set out in the Seville Declaration of 2002 and expanded in the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of 22/07/2014], such as:

• A border agreement between the two countries, based on the 4 June 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps that can be agreed between the parties. The EU will recognise changes to the pre-1967 borders, including in relation to Jerusalem, only when they have been agreed between the parties.
• Security arrangements which, for Palestinians, respect their sovereignty and demonstrate that the occupation is over and, for Israelis, protect their security, prevent the re-emergence of terrorism and effectively address security threats, including new and vital threats in the region.
• A solution to the refugee issue that is fair, mutually agreed and realistic.
• Fulfilment of both sides’ aspirations for Jerusalem. A way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of both states.

A file with the main EU conclusions affecting the Palestinian-Israeli issue can be downloaded here: Main EU Conclusions on Israel and Palestine.

The EU appointed a first European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) in 1996, a position held until 2003 by Spain’s Moratinos; between 2003 and 2012 by Belgium’s Otte; between 2012 and 2013 by Germany’s Reinicke; between 2014 and 2015 the functions were taken over by the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Germany’s Schmidt; between 2015 and 2018 Italy’s Gentilini; between 2018 and 2021 the Netherlands’ Terstal; and from 2021, also from the Netherlands, Koopmans. It is not for nothing that the Netherlands is the Quartet’s largest donor (providing 36% of the Quartet’s funding between 2015 and 2022). Successive EUSRs for the MEPP have accompanied the peace process.

In 2021 the Commission presented a Communication on EU-Southern Neighbourhood relations containing an Agenda for the Mediterranean, which was endorsed by the 27 member states (MS) through FAC Conclusions of 19/04/2021, stating on page 15 that: ‘the EU and its MS and partner countries should renew efforts to reach an agreement in the Middle East peace process. In this regard, the EU will seek to encourage and build on the recent establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and some Arab countries, with a view to enhancing the prospects for a negotiated two-state solution based on internationally agreed parameters, as well as regional peace and security’, and that “the EU and its southern partners share a common interest in supporting a revitalised rules-based multilateral system revolving around the UN”.

The EU’s 27 Member States have different sensitivities towards the MEPP and, while collectively supportive of the above, two broadly distinct groups can also be distinguished according to their more pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian sensitivities. Thus, countries such as Germany, Hungary, Poland and the Netherlands are more sympathetic to Israeli postulates, while others such as Ireland, Belgium, Sweden, Malta and Spain are more sensitive to Palestinian postulates.

B. PROPOSED SOLUTION

1. Summarising the starting point and positions

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict began in 1881, when the waves of Jewish migration to the land of historic Palestine began; the United Kingdom advocated the creation of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ on the land of historic Palestine; the State of Israel was created in 1948; but a state embracing the Palestinian population still does not exist in 2024.

The ultimate goal is to achieve a paradigm shift in the region away from the use of force. Neither military action by an occupying power, Israel, nor subversive action by the occupied actors, the Palestinian militias, should have any place in the 21st century. Continuing to apply this scheme (derived from the current status quo of an occupying power and an occupied population) will only continue to generate vicious circles of frustration and death.

Among the starting positions are two antithetical ones:

• The creation of Greater Israel in the entirety of historic Palestine and the expulsion from there of the Palestinian population that has not yet been expelled.
• The creation of Greater Palestine in the whole of historic Palestine and the expulsion of the Jews and their return to their countries of origin.

The former (Greater Israel) is advocated by part of Zionism and the latter (Greater Palestine) by part of the Palestinian resistance. Although both have support within their respective populations, I believe that neither is a viable option, for different reasons. Although Zionism is close to achieving its goal of Greater Israel and members of its current government advocate the total expulsion of the Palestinian population from Gaza, I believe that the international community should not endorse an option that violates existing international law and represents an enormous historical injustice. On the other hand, Israel’s great political, military, economic and media power makes the Greater Palestine option impossible in practice. Continuing to advocate either of these two antithetical options will only bring more hatred and more death.

Removing these two antithetical options from the equation, then, would leave, in my view, only two viable options:

1. The two-state solution: the creation of Palestine alongside Israel, with clearly delineated borders between the two, and both states with full sovereignty. To articulate the two-state solution, permanent status negotiations would have to be concluded by reaching final agreements on borders; security; Jerusalem and refugees. This would imply, in principle, Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines – with equivalent land swaps – which would necessarily entail the dismantling of most Jewish settlements in the West Bank (illegal under public international law). From then on, each state would be responsible for looking after its population within its borders, unlike now when the PNA cannot protect the Palestinian population from attacks by Israeli settlers because it does not have legitimacy/ sovereignty over its territory (the West Bank). This is the option that is enshrined in all UN resolutions and would have been the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian framework of agreements if they had been complied with. According to the latest polls of October 2023, 71% of Israeli Palestinians, 28% of Israeli Jews and 24% of Palestinians supported this option.
2. The solution of a single democratic state for both peoples that would house the entire population of historic Palestine, including Jews and Palestinians (also refugees), under a single truly democratic state: Israel-Falastin or Filastin-Israil. To articulate the solution of a single unitary state, it would be sufficient to change a substantial part of Israeli law, specifically that which emphasises Jewishness, to a state that includes all races and faiths on an equal footing. In each area, it would be Israelis and Palestinians themselves (with the advantage here that 20% of Israel’s population are Palestinians) who know best what legislation should be changed. For example, Israeli university professor Nurit Peled, who received the European Parliament’s 2001 Sakhraov Prize, could be the one to lead the talks in terms of inclusive education. In this case, neither the issue of borders nor that of Jerusalem would have to be addressed. As for the Palestinian refugee population after both the 1948 Nakba and the 1967 Naqsa, according to Palestinian geographer Salman Abu-Sitta ‘the areas from which the majority of the Palestinian refugee population comes from are inhabited by only 1.5% of the Israeli population… and 90% of the villages are still empty’, which would make it easier to reach an agreement. According to polls from December 2023, this option has 23% support among Palestinians and 20% among Israeli Jews. This option has been and is advocated, on the Palestinian side, by personalities such as Edward Said, Mustafa Barghouti and Ali Abunimah; and, on the Israeli side, by the historian Illan Pappé.

There are millions of Jewish men and women in Israel and around the world, as well as millions of Palestinian men and women in Palestine and around the world, who do not share either of the two antithetical options, and I am convinced that a significant part of both populations could support either of the two viable options.

Personally, I prefer the one-state option, but I believe it is even more difficult to implement than the two-state solution, whose implementation will require the highest levels of honesty on the part of the entire international community, and very strong support from civil societies worldwide.

2. Ideal scenario for conflict resolution

Ideally, the populations should be consulted on which option they prefer and then articulate it. One could think of a sequenced scheme of sorts:

• An initial international conference to help the parties set the parameters for each of the two viable options, which would be set out in an initial Declaration of Principles-type document;
• National consultations between the two groups (Israelis and Palestinians) through referendums;
• Followed by bipartite meetings followed by international peace conference(s) to finalise the solution chosen by the respective populations in the event that both referendums have arrived at the same viable solution.

3. Realistic scenario for conflict resolution

However, this ideal scenario would be impossible to articulate in the event that both referenda opt for different options, which severely limits its feasibility. Moreover, the severity of the fighting in 2023-2024 makes it very difficult to imagine being able to articulate both the ideal referendum scenario and the one-state solution in the short term. And a solution to this conflict can no longer be delayed. It has already taken long enough.

Therefore, the case is made for moving firmly towards a two-state solution and, once that is in place, at a later stage, referendums could always be held on the creation of a confederation between the two countries; or on the establishment of a single democratic state in which both peoples live side by side.

Palestine cannot remain hostage to the failures of the Oslo Accords, with a PNA that is a vassal of Israel and has no real capacity to protect its population, and a State of Israel and its settlers that systematically violate the human rights of the Palestinian population.

A free, sovereign Palestinian state must be established as soon as possible , with internationally recognised borders in which the entire Palestinian population, both those who remained and those who were expelled, and their descendants (if they freely choose to do so), can live in dignity, and which has territorial contiguity.

4. Procedural iter for the articulation of the two-state solution: peace conference leading to a definitve peace agreement

Similar to the multiple peace conferences that have sought to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the past, the first, historically speaking, sponsored by the United Nations and the last, sponsored consecutively by the US and Russia or solely by the US, an international conference is proposed to accompany Israelis and Palestinians in addressing all the issues that have been pending since 1995 and which could have the following parameters:

4.1 Location: similar to what happened in 1991, another conference in Madrid could be envisaged. Although the location is not the most important thing, it is important that the host country undertakes to respect the immunity of the people who attend in the respective negotiating teams.

4.2. Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams: They must be negotiating teams that reflect the greatest possible plurality in the sense that they can truly represent the feelings of broad sectors of the respective populations, without either of the two teams (and even less the international sponsors) being able to exercise any right of veto over this composition.

4.3. International sponsors: Unlike in Madrid, which was only sponsored by the US and Russia, this time the conference should be sponsored by the entire Quartet, i.e. the US, Russia, the UN and the EU, plus the League of Arab States (LAS), so that both Israel and Palestine would have someone behind them. Specifically in relation to the EU, the introduction to this proposal details the existing division within the EU due to different sensibilities, some more pro-Israeli and others more pro-Palestinian, which could be a fundamental support for both parties in the negotiating process. In relation to the UN, which was unjustly excluded from the Madrid Conference in 1991, it is the repository of a very rich legal acquis, including the resolution that led to the creation of Israel and the 2022 resolution that requested the ICJ to rule on the illegality of the Israeli occupation, an advisory opinion that was issued on 19 July 2024 and which can make a decisive contribution to laying the foundations for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is therefore historically just that the UN should also play a role in shaping the final solution to this centuries-old conflict. China, which has played an important role in intra-Palestinian reconciliation, could also be added in 2024. The role of international sponsors will be crucial in achieving that:

• The Definitive Peace Agreement (DPA) is negotiated and agreed within a pre-established timeframe, for which the terms of reference (ToR) of this conference must explicitly include a timeframe to address each of the blocks of which the DPA is composed; as well as mechanisms to oblige the recalcitrant party/parties to advance in the negotiations and conclude them.
• The timetable for articulation provided for in the ADP should be complied with.

I believe that it would be advisable to set the negotiation period at a maximum of six months and the articulation period at a maximum of one year.

4.4. Definitive Peace Agreement (DPA):

4.4.1. The future DPA must at all costs avoid falling into the same faults as the Interim Agreement (faults detailed in points 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8 of the introduction to this document), i.e. Palestine must not be born as a vassal state of Israel, but must be a state free and free to decide on its future in all areas, including having its own national defence.

4.4.2 . The future DPA must address all the issues that have been pending for more than thirty years, among which the following are a priority:

• Border demarcation on the basis of UN resolutions (the 1967 armistice lines) with exchanges of territory agreed by the parties (even if this involves the dismantling of illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, similar to how Israel in the past dismantled settlements it had erected in Egypt’s Sinai and northern Gaza) aimed at achieving territorial contiguity for both (which may include imaginative solutions). It is unacceptable that Israel should continue to be allowed to remain the only UN state without border demarcation.
• A final and definitive solution to the refugee issue through the creation of an International Commission and a Special Fund to finance it.
• Shared capital of Jerusalem.
• Equitable sharing of natural resources, including water in particular.

All issues have been widely discussed over the years and there are many drafts of possible agreements (e.g. the Geneva Accords: https://geneva-accord.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/The-Geneva-Accord_-Full-Text.pdf) to draw on.

4.4.3. The future DPA must set out a clear, firm, achievable and realistic timetable for articulation.

4.4.4. The future DPA must remedy the main flaw of the 1993 DP (see point 4.2. of the introduction of this document), i.e. it must have mechanisms for the recalcitrant party to comply with what has been agreed (and what has been agreed must be complied with according to the Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda).

4.4.5. The future DPA should incorporate all existing tools that facilitate its articulation (or create new ones if necessary), such as resorting to International Missions, always under the auspices of the UN, and not of third countries as in the past.

It is essential that the international community commits itself to the process so that the DPA can be successfully implemented and a conflict that has already claimed too many thousands of deaths in its 140 years of existence can be halted : more than 130,000, including 119,330 Arabs, mostly Palestinians, and 13,625 Israelis. This figure is obtained by adding the number of deaths calculated in footnote 138 of the pdf ‘Brief Chronology of the History of Palestine and Israel’ of this tab on ‘Palestine’ of this website (or in footnote 17 of the web text of this entry); and those estimated in the Gaza War until 3 July 2024, which are included in footnote 13 of the pdf of another document of this same tab called ‘Palestine, especially Gaza, from October 2023’.